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Abstract
This article argues that the program of  compensation reform at financial 
institutions – despite recent wide-ranging changes – remains incomplete. A 
considerable body of  theoretical and empirical research has been developed 
which, for the most part, suggests that compensation incentives embedded 
in compensation contracts at banks encouraged risk-taking behaviour which 
contributed to the Global Financial Crisis. Extensive reforms to compensation 
rules at financial institutions have been implemented across the globe, including 
increased use of  deferral, mandatory capping of  bonuses and the introduction 
of  claw-back powers. Relying on observations on the failures of  Icelandic 
and UK banks, and legal and economic analyses of  compensation reforms in 
each jurisdiction, this paper argues that some elements of  the Icelandic and 
UK reform programs ought to be transposed to the EU level. Arguably, these 
recommendations will help improve the resilience of  the European banking 
system and contribute to greater financial stability.
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Introduction
In spite of  the extensive structural and regulatory reforms on financial oversight in 
Europe, this article argues that the program of  reform to executive compensation at 
banks in the EU remains incomplete. We argue that, in constructing further restric-
tions on bankers’ incentives in the EU, regulators ought to pay regard to the reforms 
to compensation systems in both the UK and Iceland, two jurisdictions which suffered 
immense damage to their economies during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). One of  
the key themes to emerge from the GFC was that excessive risk-taking by bankers and 
traders at financial institutions had been encouraged by incentives embedded in their 
compensation packages. It was not simply at senior levels that perverse compensation 
incentives were present; however, it has been the pay incentives of  senior bankers that 
have been cited – arguably with much justification – for the risk-taking behavior which 
characterized the pre-GFC banking business. Whilst there are some differences in their 
focus, a large proportion of  studies point to a strong relationship between executive 
compensation and excessive institutional risk-taking – characterized by both an increase 
in asset risk and in short-termist business strategies – as the adoption of  excessive risk 
resulted in huge financial reward. Short-termism in these compensation contracts was 
manifested in several ways, but especially through the award of  performance-based bo-
nuses which prioritized return on equity (RoE) as a performance-measurement metric, 
and through the increased award of  stock options at banks to managers, the use of  
which may encourage short-term strategic horizons.
On the basis of  studies purporting to demonstrate a link between excessive risk and 
private incentives – and also perhaps with a nod to political sensibilities concerning the 
role of  banks in causing the post-2008 global recession – there has been large-scale 
reform to the structure and composition of  bankers’ compensation incentives, with 
the general aim of  reducing the capacity for bankers to profit individually from exces-
sive risk-taking. These reforms are at various stages of  implementation in developed 
Western financial centers, with some jurisdictions implementing much deeper reforms 
than others. This itself  raises two of  the main challenges facing regulators in this area: 
firstly, to create a level-playing field for employees of  institutions which operate at the 
supranational or multi-jurisdictional level in what is now undoubtedly a global business 
sector; and secondly, to discourage a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ amongst regulatory jurisdic-
tions hoping to attract banking business. 
Moreover, we shall argue that the dangers posed by inappropriate incentives have 
arguably not been sufficiently marginalized by recent reforms to compensation in the 
EU, and we therefore believe that further reform will be necessary if  the stability of  the 
financial system is to be safeguarded. To build this case, we rely, firstly, on empirical work 
which focuses on the incentive problems which contributed to the Icelandic banking 
collapses. These collapses were (with Icelandic bank assets exceeding GDP by a factor 
of  ten) by far the largest experienced during the GFC in relative terms, and the back-
ground stories of  disastrous decision-making driven in many respects by poor incentives 
offer important lessons on both the causes of  financial fragility and solutions to moder-
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ating the power of  incentives to generate that fragility. We secondly analytically discuss 
research into compensation-related drivers of  both UK and European bank failures, to 
demonstrate that the Icelandic experience was not an outlier, and that flawed incentives 
have the capacity to cause system-wide meltdown when operative at mega-banks, and 
may occur in jurisdictions supposedly characterized by regulatory sophistication and 
advanced risk management practices. This will also provide context for our later discus-
sion of  the reform of  remuneration incentives at UK and Icelandic banks, the principles 
of  which we posit ought to be incorporated into well-designed compensation system at 
the EU level. 
Of  course, the causes of  the multiple banking failures in Iceland as well as in Europe 
and the US are neither simple nor clear cut. It is impossible to accord proportionate 
weighting to the many drivers of  the crisis, which included macroeconomic imbalanc-
es, a well-documented savings glut, inappropriate monetary policies, a lack of  financial 
oversight or cross-border surveillance, and misplaced faith in modern risk-management 
techniques, as well as poor micro- and macro– incentives. Whilst recognizing this plural-
ity, we concentrate our analysis solely on incentive pay structures as a contributing factor 
to the banking collapses, and leave it to other scholars to account for alternative causes. 
The article is organized as follows. In the following section, we survey some of  
the main literature on the topic of  executive compensation incentives and risk-taking, 
including at banks. In Section 2, we undertake a brief  case study examining the incen-
tive problems which led to the Icelandic banking collapse and further contrast these 
findings with other research into the remuneration structures and executive behaviors 
at large UK and EU banks to draw parallels with the Icelandic experience. In Section 
3, we provide an overview of  reforms to the composition of  senior banker compensa-
tion packages in the UK and Iceland and contrast these efforts with the more limited 
measures thus far adopted in the EU. In Section 4, we make some recommendations for 
further reform to senior bankers’ pay, in light of  the empirical and theoretical findings 
presented earlier in the paper. Section 5 concludes.
1. Literature
A tremendous growth in research on executive pay in publicly-listed firms has been 
witnessed over the last two decades which has greatly increased our understanding of  
pay practices in listed companies. Much of  this research does not, however, take into ac-
count the endogenous nature of  compensation contracts, which are largely determined 
through bargaining power based-interactions between the CEO, the remuneration com-
mittee, and the board of  directors, where CEO outside options, monitoring capacity of  
the board and compensation consultants may have significant impact. It also neglects 
the largely hidden design of  compensation contracts of  employees at marginally lower 
levels of  organizations and how much impact those incentives may or may not have on 
their levels of  production, even where those members are very senior (so-called ‘C-level 
staff ’). Many important questions regarding the effects of  incentive pay on behaviors of  
C-level staff  and by implication on operational outcome, therefore remain unanswered, 
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as the main problem with measuring the effects of  compensation still remains that 
of  identification. As a result, compensation arrangements are associated with a large 
number of  observable and unobservable variables, derived from both firm and em-
ployee characteristics, making it difficult to interpret any observed correlation between 
executive pay and firm outcomes as evidence of  a causal relationship (Frydman and 
Jenter 2010). This problem is particularly precarious in banks because of  the difficulty 
in differentiating causality between individual decision-making and the overall economic 
climate.
Notwithstanding these observations, research on compensation in both banks and 
non-financial firms suggests that incentives such as stock options and earnings-based 
performance bonuses may increase risk in several ways. For example, there appears to be 
a link between incentive compensation and the manipulation of  earnings and/or other 
benchmarks; for example, earnings-based bonus plans incentivize earnings management 
(Healy 1985; Holthausen et al. 1995) and firms manipulate the disclosure of  information 
around CEO option awards, delaying the release of  good news and accelerating the dis-
closure of  bad news (Aboody & Kasznik 2000; Yermack 1997). Equity-based incentives 
may encourage managers to continue to expend firm resources to manipulate the stock 
price upwards over the short-term (Peng & Roell 2008) whilst there is positive relation-
ship between introduction of  higher proportions of  equity incentives and subsequent 
increases in firm risk (Chen et al. 2006). A series of  studies also document a positive cor-
relation between CEOs’ equity incentives and earnings manipulation (Cheng & Warfield 
2005; Bergstresser & Philippon 2006; Burns & Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007; Johnson 
et al. 2009). Empirical research also confirms a link between litigation risk and compen-
sation incentives: Talley and Johnsen (2005) and Roell and Peng (2008) each document a 
non-linear relationship between variable pay and litigation risk of  the firm.  
In the case of  banks, the risks inherent in compensation contracts may lead to par-
ticularly destabilizing trends, due mainly to their high leverage, and the interaction be-
tween equity-based compensation awards and capital structure. Despite the so-called 
“debt-equity irrelevance proposition theorem” (Modigliani & Miller 1958), in the pres-
ence of  financial distortions such as tax differentiation, information asymmetries, bailout 
guarantees and agency costs, high leverage leads to greater firm instability. Axiomatically, 
leverage magnifies the effects of  changes in trading positions and will lead to higher 
profits (or losses) relative to unleveraged positions in the event of  price movements. On 
this basis, Minsky (1986) noted some time ago that managers at banks rewarded through 
stock options have strong incentives to expand the balance sheet of  their institutions 
and increase leverage. Paradoxically, this state of  affairs is not helped by the use of  
so-called managerial ‘disciplining’ devices, including stock options, takeover threats, or 
board monitoring of  managerial performance, each of  which increases the likelihood of  
higher leverage (Berger et al. 1997).  
In the absence of  any downside risk – for example, sanctions for failure or any de-
ferral/claw-back mechanisms relating to compensation – bank management has strong 
incentives to increase leverage to chase profits, which may be especially strong where 
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markets are exhibiting signs of  over-exuberance and unsustainable rises in price levels 
(often referred to as ‘bubbles’). There is a considerable body of  research which dem-
onstrates clear links between asset prices and the supply of  credit (Borio & Lowe 2002; 
Detken & Smets 2004). There is also a strongly evidenced link between increases in 
risk-taking by banks and the various stages of  the leverage cycle, during which banks’ 
capital structures become less robust, thanks to investor (and banker) expectations of  
future price increases which appear to justify lower collateral demands (Bhattacharya et 
al 2011; Geanokoplos 2010). An indirect implication of  this phenomenon – that increas-
ing bank leverage may cause asset price inflation (Fostel & Geanakoplos 2013) – is that 
leverage that drives an asset bubble also feeds into the size of  stock-based compensation 
for bank executives (Cullen 2014). Research further demonstrates that bank compensa-
tion contracts encourage risk-taking to profit from speculative stock price rises, providing 
managerial incentives to increase the speculative component of  stock prices to increase 
short-term returns (Bolton et al. 2005). On the basis of  these findings, it is perhaps to 
be expected that the higher the stock-option wealth within financial firms the higher 
the bankruptcy risk of  that firm (Armstrong & Vashishtha 2012) and that asset write-
downs during the GFC were more strongly related to asset volatility in highly leveraged 
financial institutions (Chesney et al. 2011). In contrast, in situations where top bankers 
receive a greater proportion of  their remuneration in salary and bonuses rather than 
stock options, they are less likely to take high risks (Palia & Porter 2004). 
Whilst the executive compensation literature is rich in explaining the ways in which 
remuneration may encourage excessive risk taking, it lacks a clear explanation as to where 
the motivation to do so originates. Possible rationales may be found in contributions by 
Akerlof  and Shiller (2015) and Akerlof  and Romer (1993). Akerlof  and Romer in par-
ticular show that incentives exist for firms to “go broke for profit at society’s expense 
(to loot) instead of  to go for broke (to gamble on success).” Where lax regulation and 
accounting practices or low individual penalties dominate, owners are granted an incen-
tive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt 
obligations. Of  course, this implies that bankruptcy for profit is especially likely in the 
presence of  government guarantees – either explicit or implicit – of  financial institution 
liabilities. Under such circumstances bankruptcy for profit can easily become a more at-
tractive strategy for owners of  the firm rather than maximizing true economic value as 
it increases the extractable rents available. Other motivations to gamble at play beyond 
compensation incentives (especially in the banking sector) include extreme competition 
and tight margins, career concerns and shareholder risk aversion, each of  which places 
limits on the effectiveness of  compensation reforms in isolation to reduce excessive 
risk-taking (Avgouleas & Cullen 2015).
In acknowledging these empirical challenges, it is necessary to take stock of  cases 
where confidentiality has been lifted (the Icelandic case) or extensive corroborative evidence may be 
found to infer a relationship between compensation incentives and excessive risk (the UK and EU) 
to avoid building policy proposals only on empirical evidence that may be marked by 
identification problems between cause and effect. On this basis, we now turn to the case 
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of  the Icelandic bank collapses of  2008 and some parallels in the UK and European 
jurisdictions, which highlight how the design of  compensation systems may contribute 
to weak capital structures (including manipulation) and excessive risk-taking.
2. The failure of the Icelandic banks: a brief case study 
A rare opportunity to test the hypothesis that equity compensation incentives lead to 
excessive risks and misreporting arose in the case of  failed financial institutions in Ice-
land following the GFC. Between 2000 and 2008, Iceland’s banking system experienced 
exponential growth; in 2008 some 97% of  the system collapsed. Following this, the 
Icelandic Parliament established a Special Investigation Commission (SIC) to report on 
how Iceland’s banking sector failed. Naturally, in a sector of  such complexity, there were 
many obstacles in documenting a link between compensation and risk in the Icelandic 
system; yet, thanks to virtually unconstrained access to data, legal documents, and bank-
ers’ testimony, the evidence collected by the SIC indicates strongly that incentive pay 
– as well as psychological factors such as bounded rationality and groupthink – played 
a significant role. Moreover, as we shall outline, developments in the structure and scale 
of  compensation at Icelandic banks closely mirrored trends at banks in other jurisdic-
tions.
2.1 Icelandic bank expansion
Between 2003 and 2008, the assets of  Iceland’s three largest banks - Glitnir, Kaupth-
ing Bank and Landsbanki - grew from 1,451 billion ISK to 14,437 billion ISK, thanks 
largely to four main developments: (i) an increase in the size and incidence of  mergers 
and takeovers by Icelandic banks of  foreign institutions; (ii) greater competition in retail 
lending, particularly for mortgages; (iii) higher volumes of  lending to foreign parties, in-
cluding intra-group and inter-group loans; and (iv) financial innovation, particularly the 
use of  Icelandic bank securities in CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations) sold in US 
debt markets thanks to their high credit rating (SIC 2010 Chapter 21). Two main con-
sequences flowed from these developments: first, Icelandic banks became much more 
dependent on borrowing in short-term debt markets to fund their assets; and second, 
Icelandic bank system leverage rose significantly.
In spite of  this increased fragility, the average Icelandic bank RoE indicated ex-
traordinary profitability; indeed, Icelandic bank reported RoE exceeded other Nordic 
institutions’ average each year, often by wide margins. Reported book equity was also 
remarkably high, meaning that these high RoE figures were being delivered with rela-
tively high capital ratios. The reported efficiency of  Iceland’s banks’ investments was 
also remarkable; between 2003 and 2008, with the exception of  2007, Iceland’s banks 
reported mean return on assets (RoA) of  over double that of  other Nordic banks, in 
spite of  the higher cost of  funds experienced by Iceland’s banks thanks to their reliance 
on wholesale funding (Flannery 2010). 
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2.2 Capital manipulation and compensation incentives
Upon investigation, it became clear that the high profitability and high capital figures 
were based upon large reporting and accounting manipulations. In the context of  this 
article, there is strong evidence that the changes in behavior were driven by incentive-pay 
in the Icelandic banking sector and later on by a bet-for-resurrection philosophy. This 
manipulation was systemic: even prior to the privatization of  the major banks in Iceland 
(which was only completed in 2000) instruments had been set up in relation to bankers’ 
variable pay that had the effect of  misreporting equity levels (SIC Volume 3, 2010, 60). 
One of  the main forms of  capital manipulation found by the SIC was inappropri-
ate hedging of  option grants to staff, both in Landsbanki and Bundadarbanki (which 
later merged with Kaupthing), through off-shore special purpose vehicles (SPV), which 
were under the de facto control of  the banks’ management. In the case of  Landsbanki, 
initially these SPVs were funded by Landsbanki itself. The SPVs, in return, went to the 
stock market to buy shares in Landsbanki, which consequently affected Landsbanki’s 
share price, particularly as management exercised control over the timing of  sales and 
purchases. A forward contract was set up between Landsbanki and the SPV to cover the 
funding costs of  the SPV. The intent was that as the options vested, the SPV would sell 
Landsbanki its shares back at strike price, at no “extra cost” to the bank, since options 
would only be exercised in the event that the share price had risen, and the bank was 
now hedged against a rise in the share price. The fact that the bank was still exposed 
against its own downside risk was ignored, despite the fact that the SPV would never 
be able to repay the loan if  the shares of  Landsbanki fell in value, let alone if  the bank 
became insolvent. The risk of  the SPVs investment in the shares of  Landsbanki there-
fore remained on the bank’s balance sheet, even though their value ought to have been 
deducted from the equity base according to IFRS accounting standards. Axiomatically, 
the equity cushion in the case of  these SPV holdings was non-existent in this regard. As 
funding conditions tightened in 2006, funding of  these SPVs was moved from Lands-
banki to rival banks, Glitnir, Kaupthing and Straumur. In return, Landsbanki issued a 
banker’s guarantee against the default of  the SPVs. 
As Landsbanki collapsed, 13.4% of  its shares in Landsbanki were held in eight dif-
ferent SPVs or trusts, which were set up with the same purpose of  holding shares of  
Landsbanki to hedge employee call options in the bank (SIC Volume 3, 2010, 60-9). The 
eight SPVs combined were the second largest owner of  Landsbanki shares and one of  
them, Empennage Ltd, was among the 20 largest owners in Landsbanki according to 
the Moody’s Company Profile in June 2007. Landsbanki’s former in-house counsel testi-
fied to the SIC that he was asked by management to collect proxies from the off-shore 
entities to cast a vote on the bank’s remuneration policy at the annual general meeting 
in 2007, which awarded large compensation packages to top executives; he duly did so 
(SIC Volume 3, 2010, 68-9). Dubious accounting practices were also used to artificially 
increase revenues at Landsbanki. A third of  the bank’s 2008 half-year profits were due 
to a valuation between market terms of  funding and funding terms of  a loan portfolio 
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comprising so-called total-return-swaps (TRS). At the time, the bank accounted for $56 
mln in revenue due to this mark-to-market funding difference, but refunded the TRS on 
June 30th at terms that would have left the bank with only $6 mln in revenues for this 
item. There was no mention of  this in the banks’ accounts as required by IFRS account-
ing standards (SIC Volume 2, 2010, 65-7).
Similar practices were present in Glitnir and Kaupthing. Glitnir’s employees had bor-
rowed the equivalent amount of  17% of  Glitnir’s equity base to buy shares in the bank. 
The employees enjoyed exceptional funding terms, often better than the sovereign and 
the bank itself. No collateral was requested to back these loans, apart from the shares 
themselves (loan-to-value 100%) and, at times, put options were issued by the bank, 
leaving staff  virtually risk-free from market movements and repayment of  the loan (SIC 
Volume 3, 2010, 33-9, 44-5). Kaupthing employees also received favorable lending terms 
and put options on the underlying shares in Kaupthing. Auditors of  Kaupthing pointed 
out that IFRS standards demanded the equity base to be written down in line with put 
options issued. In response, Kaupthing management requested staff  members to issue 
10% personal guarantees against the loans, instead of  staff  receiving put options to 
hedge against drop in the shares, the underlying collateral. Again, no collateral (aside 
from the shares themselves) was requested. The board of  Kaupthing passed a resolu-
tion to exempt staff  members from the personal guarantee a week before the bank col-
lapsed (SIC Volume 3, 2010, 78-83).  Kaupthing staff  members and management, who 
took part in the stock purchasing program were the owners of  the shares, and received 
dividends accordingly. 
There is also compelling evidence that options grants in Iceland’s major banks were 
often supported not by true outside investment, but through funding from rival banks, 
with contracts and guarantees in place to ensure that the issuing bank in fact carried all 
the risk of  its own equity. This ‘cartel-like’ behavior saw Icelandic banks agreeing to re-
ciprocal funding arrangements simply in order to support their aggregate equity values. 
In the event, as credit conditions worsened considerably in 2008, when staff  members 
tried to exercise their options as the options vested, management of  the bank tried to 
influence staff  not to exercise, issuing announcements stating that the exercise of  these 
rights would be harmful for the bank. The exercise of  options at this point became sub-
ject to management approval which was, unsurprisingly, invariably refused (SIC Volume 
3, 2010, 61). However, thanks somewhat to the manipulation discussed, from 2004-
2007, variable compensation as a share of  total pay in the Icelandic banking sector grew 
immensely and in some cases from 35% to 90% for top 1% earners (Johnsen 2014). 
2.3 Parallels with the UK & EU
The developments in compensation systems at Icelandic banks were symptomatic of  
changes in remuneration structures across global banking institutions, including in the 
EU and UK. The trend in increased executive compensation occurred largely in re-
sponse to increased institutional size, as well as compensating executives for shareholder 
returns generated by higher leverage. Whilst the just-discussed mechanisms used in Ice-
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land were somewhat different to those employed in EU and UK banks, which relied less 
on overt capital structure arbitrage and manipulation and more on the use of  innovation 
in risk-weight management processes and opaque intermediation chains, the motives 
were synonymous: the desire to obtain capital relief  to fund further investments, par-
tially incentivized by prevailing compensation structures. Few cases have been brought 
to court in Europe as a result of  the GFC; therefore, unlike in Iceland, there is a lack 
of  availability of  non-confidential information relating to bankers’ responses to incen-
tives. However, a cursory glance at capital levels and compensation size at both UK and 
EU banks may be used to infer similar developments as those which occurred at those 
in Iceland (for the sake of  brevity, we confine the analysis to general trends across the 
jurisdictions mentioned).
Recent evidence from the UK for example suggests that compensation practices 
were causative of  some reckless behavior leading up to the GFC; indicatively, the FSA 
in 2009 commented that “inappropriate incentive structures played a role in encouraging 
behavior which contributed to the financial crisis.” The main culprit was arguably the 
strong focus placed on RoE as a performance-measurement metric, which became com-
monplace in the pre-GFC banking environment. As a focus on RoE incentivizes lever-
age, the dangers of  RoE-based compensation plans become clear: “Individuals have 
incentives to be preoccupied with short-term leveraged growth rather than sustainability 
and good conduct” (UK Parliamentary Commission 2013). 
Indeed, in the context of  the incentive structures prevalent at the UK’s largest banks 
the FSA (2011) made it clear that the incentives to focus on increasing revenue, prof-
its, assets and leverage (rather than on capital, liquidity and asset quality) provided by 
explicit reference in incentives packages to measures such as operating profit, earnings 
per share growth and return on equity, were ubiquitous across the UK banking sector. 
Without any form of  inbuilt malus or claw-back, axiomatically, “[s]uch a design of  … 
compensation provides executives with incentives to seek improvements in short-term 
earnings figures even at the cost of  maintaining an excessively high risk of  large losses 
down the road” (Bebchuk & Fried 2010). 
CEOs and other executives at UK banks were thereby incentivized partly by their 
compensation systems to chase shareholder returns: accordingly, RoE increased at large 
UK banks from 1% in 1989, to 38% by 2007 (Haldane 2012). However, as Haldane 
notes, “[V]irtually all of  the increase in RoE of  major banks [since 2000] appears to have 
been the result of  higher leverage. Banks’ return on assets – a more precise measure of  
their productivity – was flat or even falling over this period ... [Higher returns in this pe-
riod are therefore] likely to have been an act of  risk illusion.” Naturally, this higher RoE 
fed into profits and therefore compensation plans. Yet, the widespread nature of  these 
incentives and the capital structure fragility they induced resulted in a weakly capitalized 
UK banking system, despite the significant shareholder returns produced; there was a 
clear increase in leverage across the UK banking system in the lead-up to 2008 (World 
Bank 2009). 
European-level banks engaged in similar practices. The De Larosiere Report (2009) 
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to the European Commission concluded that: “Remuneration and incentive schemes 
within financial institutions contributed to excessive risk-taking by rewarding short-
term expansion of  the volume of  (risky) trades rather than the long-term profitability 
of  investments… the structure of  this remuneration, induce[d] too high risk-taking 
and encourage short-termism to the detriment of  long-term performance.” As with 
the UK, a good deal of  this risk-taking comprised higher leverage – both on- and off-
balance sheet, which increased markedly at European banks in the run-up to the GFC; 
in a survey of  European bank leverage (ABN AMRO, Banco Santander, BNP Paribas, 
Commerzbank, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Société Générale, UBS, 
and UniCredit SpA), it was found that average leverage ratios (assets-to-capital multiple) 
increased from just over 20:1 in 2000 to over 32:1 in 2008 (World Bank 2009) Another 
study places average European bank leverage in 2008 at over 50:1 (Bologna et al 2014). 
Naturally, these trends invite comparison with those at UK and Icelandic banks, and 
it is clear that similar capital relief  techniques were employed in order to reduce capital 
requirements and free up balance sheets for further lending. At the Swiss bank UBS, 
for example, management increased significantly the securitization of  mortgage assets, 
and at the same time, the bank began to retain a large proportion of  these collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs) on its balance sheet. Because these CDOs were rated highly 
(normally AAA), the bank did not have to find any additional capital to fund these as-
sets. Moreover, this had profound consequences in the context of  executive and trader 
compensation; bankers at UBS had serious incentives to grow the balance sheet as large 
as possible as, in the absence of  capital charges, these securities delivered huge profits as 
banks earned pure alpha on these instruments, and thereby increased RoE. As executive 
bonuses at banks were determined by reference to their RoE, the size of  bankers’ com-
pensation was linked directly to the size of  its CDO positions. Similar practices were 
engaged in across EU banks (Clementi et al. 2009).
As noted in the introduction, we are not, of  course, suggesting that these trends were 
driven entirely by compensation incentives, as the motives for operating with low capital 
levels extend to other drivers. Yet, there is no escaping the logic that – as in Iceland – 
compensation systems in the EU and UK favored extremely short-term timeframes and 
did not adequately mitigate the risks of  relying on weak capital even in the face of  bal-
ance sheet expansion. When these incentives operate at a systemic-level, regulation of  
those incentives and proper calibration of  their application becomes warranted.
3. Recent reforms to compensation: EU, UK and Iceland
In this section we briefly outline the progress of  reform programs undertaken in the 
EU, UK, and Iceland in order to establish the current regulatory position with regard to 
bank executive compensation in each jurisdiction. In doing so, we highlight idiosyncratic 
features of  the UK and Icelandic compensation regimes not currently reflect at the EU 
level, which we contend ought to be implemented on a pan-European basis.
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3.1 EU reforms
The Fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) aimed “to implement interna-
tional principles and standards at Union level by introducing an express obligation for 
credit institutions and investment firms to establish and maintain, for categories of  staff  
whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of  credit institu-
tions and investment firms, remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with 
effective risk management” (Directive 2013/36/EU, Para 62). The CRD IV compensa-
tion rules are wide-ranging and designed to catch all categories of  staff  that hold senior 
management positions or whose activities designate them a “material risk taker” (MRT). 
There were anticipated difficulties in defining the term “material risk-taker”; to this end, 
technical guidance was issued in December 2013 by the EBA to determine how to ap-
ply the term “material risk taker” to bank staff, and it is accordingly anticipated that, as 
a rule of  thumb, only the very highest earners (the top 0.3%) will be captured by the 
definition. In relation to MRTs, CRD IV contains prescriptive rules on the structure of  
their compensation. The basic principles are as follows:
( i )  Limits to compensation as a proportion of  capital - total variable remuneration should 
not limit the capacity of  the financial institution concerned to strengthen its 
capital base;
( ii )  Cap on variable compensation - There is a default position that variable compensa-
tion must be capped to the same level as fixed compensation (1:1), although with 
shareholder approval, a ratio of  1:2 will be permitted;
( iii )  Bonus structure - Up to 25 per cent of  the bonus may be paid in long term instru-
ments valued on a discounted basis (which will result in a ratio of  greater than 
1:2). These instruments must be deferred for at least five years to be eligible for 
the discount; 
( iv)  Restriction and deferral of  variable compensation - At least 50 per cent of  the variable 
remuneration must consist of  shares or equivalent instruments which reflect the 
credit quality of  the institution as a going concern or which can be converted to 
equity in adverse circumstances. Moreover, at least 40 per cent of  the variable 
remuneration must be deferred over a period of  not less than three to five years. 
Where the variable remuneration component is of  a particularly high amount, at 
least 60 per cent must be deferred; and 
(v)  Clawback of  variable compensation - All bonus payments remain subject to malus 
and/or clawback, in certain circumstances, including where the staff  member 
participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant 
losses to the institution, or, failed to meet appropriate standards of  fitness and 
propriety.
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3.2 UK reforms
In addition to the provisions of  CRD IV, the Bank of  England has amended substan-
tially changes made to the UK Remuneration Code (‘Rem-Code’) now issued jointly by 
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). 
For example, whilst the Rem-Code reflects CRD IV in mandating long-term perfor-
mance-based pay, it stretches the period over which compensation awards may vest. So, 
the Rem-Code requires that a significant proportion of  non-fixed compensation (at least 
40 percent) be deferred over a period of  five years for some relevant staff  at financial 
institutions (PRA-designated risk managers with senior, managerial or supervisory roles) 
and to seven years for the most senior managers, with a further three years for senior 
managers whose firm is subject to a regulatory investigation (Bank of  England 2015). In 
relation to the director of  a firm which is particularly large, is organizationally complex 
and the nature, scope and complexity of  its activities is significant, and the remuneration 
of  that director is particularly high (£500,000 or more), the amount of  variable pay that 
must be deferred rises to 60 percent (PRA, SYSC 19.A.3.49). These periods are signifi-
cantly longer than those under CRD IV and, as we shall argue, are more appropriate to 
the banking cycle.
Under the Rem-Code, banks are also now required to consider alternative measures 
of  performance to traditional metrics such as earnings per share (EPS) or total share-
holder return (TSR), as these may encourage a short-term focus during the life of  the 
compensation plan, yet expose institutions to longer-term risks (FCA SYSC 19A.3.23). 
Accordingly, in assessing a financial firm’s performance for the purposes of  the award 
of  variable compensation to employees, remuneration committees must have regard 
principally for the institution’s risk-adjusted profits, rather than its earnings (SYSC 
19.A.3.22-19A.3.23; 19A.3.25). 
3.3 Icelandic reforms 
Under the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) Iceland is obliged to adopt all 
European Directives into Icelandic law, so much of  the Icelandic reform program will 
eventually mirror progress at the European Community level (for example, CRD IV), 
albeit with special local amendments. 
Direct changes have been made to the rules governing incentive pay at Icelandic 
financial institutions, and apply to banks, mutual funds and insurance companies. The 
Icelandic Parliamentary Law on Financial Undertakings, 2002, grants implementation 
powers to the FME which introduced reforms via regulatory instrument in June 2013. A 
major difference between the EC and Icelandic reform programs is that the main provi-
sions of  the FME regulations apply to all employees, not simply MRTs. Similarly, when 
adopting CRD IV in the spring of  2015, the Icelandic parliament used its residual power 
to implement even stricter policies on bankers’ pay, via the legal code.
The main themes of  the regulations on bankers’ compensation implemented in Ice-
land are, as stipulated by law on financial undertaking no. 161/2002 with amendments 
no. 57/2015 and 75/2010 and regulation no. 700/2011:
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( i)  Cap on variable pay – annual variable pay can be no more than 25% of  total an-
nual salary, and calculated without any bonus, although the use of  any form of  
payment instrument is permitted; 
( ii )  Heightened oversight – Incentive schemes are subject to initial approval of  the 
shareholders and the FME as well as any substantive subsequent changes to 
those schemes must be reported to and approved by the FME and shareholders. 
Three different assessments are submitted annually to the board and the FME 
by the risk management officer, the internal auditor and the compliance of-
ficer, respectively, of  whether the incentive scheme meets regulatory objectives, 
internal rules, or whether it introduces excessive risk-taking, encourages illegal 
behaviour or attempts to circumvent rules and legislation. The three assessing 
officers and their staff  are all exempt from the incentive scheme in place;
( iii )  RoRWA obligatory performance metric – at least 15% of  performance is to be meas-
ured by reference to Return on Risk Weighted Assets (RoRWA). 
( iv)  Constructive ambiguity - mandatory annual review of  incentive schemes is stipu-
lated by the regulations, in order that changes may be made to the schemes 
throughout the cycle to address such aspects as the market environment, strate-
gic focus, and any emerging or imminent risks.  This allows for a ‘constructive 
ambiguity’ in the design of  incentive schemes to prevent bank employees from 
exploiting (or ‘gaming’) the system, as rules and targets may vary from one year 
to the next; 
(v)  Prohibition on bonus pay at unprofitable banks – Should the bonus payment prevent 
the firm from turning a profit, or if  it prevents the firm to strengthen its equity 
base by the requirement of  the FME, no bonus payments should be paid out. 
Thus, in many ways, this is the intellectual twin of  the Capital Conservation 
Buffer imposed on financial institutions under Basel III (BCBS 2010);
(vi )  The Board of  Directors at financial institutions are excluded from any type of  incentive pay 
– members of  the board of  directors must be paid only in salary.
4. Recommendations based upon the UK and Icelandic reform 
programs 
We argue that, whilst the post-GFC reforms to pay at the EU-level are welcome, they 
remain subject to certain weaknesses. On this basis, we suggest that future reform of  
EU-level compensation incentives ought to be based upon the additional safeguards 
put in place in the UK and Icelandic jurisdictions.  In doing so, we do not hold the UK 
and Icelandic examples as paragons of  perfection, and we shall also consider critiques 
from beyond the legislative and policymaking communities of  existing compensation ar-
rangements.  As we acknowledge in the introduction, there is also a significant problem 
with establishing correlations between individual and overall corporate performance, 
and empirical studies are marked by measurement problems.
We favor direct reform for several reasons, but the most significant is that a con-
siderable body of  research suggests that corporate governance reform itself  (in terms 
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of  altering structures or introducing new processes) cannot prevent excessive risk in 
the banking sector (Avgouleas & Cullen 2014). In fact, there is scant evidence that cor-
porate governance has weakened over the last 30 years; instead, most indicators show 
that governance has considerably strengthened over this period (Holmström & Kaplan 
2001, Hermalin 2005) and yet, the incidence of  banking crises is increasing. Moreover, 
some studies since the GFC to show that banks with ‘good’ corporate governance and 
remuneration systems i.e. those in which shareholder and manager interests were most 
aligned, performed worse than other banks during the GFC, and suffered the most 
losses (Fahlenbrach & Stulz 2011). We cannot therefore envisage that addressing any 
perceived flaws in the traditional approaches to corporate governance and pay-setting 
– such as strengthening shareholder rights and advocating more extensive use of  ‘per-
formance-based pay’ as conceived prior to the crisis – will offer constructive solutions 
to inform future reform.
4.1 Increasing deferral periods
As outlined above, deferral requirements are common in each of  the jurisdictions we 
have examined, and reflect general industry practice. Under the so-called “informative-
ness principle” (Holmström 1979), the compensation of  managers ought to be linked to 
a measure of  performance which is as informative as possible about managerial effort. 
It is extremely difficult to assess performance in banking. One tiny mis-step – deliber-
ate or not – in the valuation of  assets and bootstrapping of  yield curves to value, or 
investment in complex, illiquid financial assets and the adoption of  large exposures, can 
translate into significant losses or significant gains for the firm as a whole, with very 
little change in reporting or the degree of  manipulation required. On this basis, where 
longer-term measures are harder to manipulate and are more informative (as is the case 
in the banking industry), managers’ pay should also be long-term, if  it is to be efficient. 
Deferral of  compensation goes some way to solving this problem by providing greater 
links between pay and performance, principally for two reasons: firstly, it dis-incentivizes 
the manipulation of  earnings or excessive risk adoption by senior managers to capture 
short-term rewards, making it less attractive for bankers to target higher investment 
risk because the threat of  default in the intervening deferral period may wipe out any 
equity-based gains in the intervening years before payout (Bhagat & Romano 2009); and 
secondly, it allows for the effects of  the financial cycle to be smoothed out, reducing 
the possibility that excessive compensation awards are captured on the basis of  inflated 
asset prices or other direct manipulation. An additional benefit of  deferral is, of  course, 
that unvested discretionary pay does not attract proprietary rights until the vesting date, 
and upon the satisfaction of  predetermined criteria. The threat of  litigation in the case 
of  bankers who leave employment voluntarily therefore ought not to be serious, provid-
ing certainty to both banks and their employees during compensation negotiations, and 
one would expect the pay market to adapt to these contingencies.
We argue that current recommended/mandatory deferral periods at the EU level (3-5 
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years) are not substantial enough to prevent the adoption of  excessive risk. On the basis 
of  the empirical work surveyed here, and the considerable research undertaken into the 
duration of  the financial cycle, the available evidence suggests that the length of  deferral 
recommended by regulatory agencies, and the somewhat limited circumstances under 
which claw-back may operate, may not be sufficient to entirely capture the financial cycle 
‘window’. This implies that deferral requirements may not provide sufficient protection 
against the re-emergence of  short-termism or, indeed, inappropriate incentive struc-
tures. In the EC and Icelandic jurisdictions, which have expressly legislated for this, the 
deferral period is a mere three-to-five years and only 40 percent of  variable compensa-
tion must be deferred. In the context of  credit cycles, which are naturally intertwined 
with the performance of  banks and which may persist for a decade or more, three years 
does not seem a long-term horizon. Research indicates that ‘short-term’ financial cycles 
may last for up to nine years (Hilbers et al. 2005), whilst ‘medium-term’ cycles may last 
anything up to 30 years (Drehmann et al. 2012). Naturally, deferral periods will assist in 
mitigating the effects of  increased risk within a sector or institution, but it is clear that 
certain risks may take many years to manifest – certainly over timeframes longer than 
three years. Furthermore, there are inconsistencies in relation to whether a deferred eq-
uity plan, which does not cover a significant period of  time, would increase a focus on 
the long-term, because there would remain a large period of  time under which the incen-
tives of  senior executives would be the same as with a non-deferred plan (Spindler 2011). 
Claw-back policies – which in the main have similar aims to mandating deferral – are 
also recommended in Iceland and the major Western financial centers. However, there 
are significant practical constraints imposed on retrieving remuneration that has already 
been awarded as an ex-post adjustment, particularly if  these payments were made a sig-
nificant time previously. Moreover, there is nascent evidence that the use of  claw-back 
may encourage earnings manipulation; specifically, there is a correlation between claw-
back and an increase in ‘real transactions management, (‘RTM’) which is a method of  
artificially boosting earnings. RTM boosts profits over the short-term, but after three 
years, the pattern reverses (Chan et al. 2015).  We therefore contend that the many draw-
backs of  enforcing and implementing claw-back could be solved by forcing banks to 
defer variable compensation for much longer periods than currently mandated. 
On this basis, we recommend that mandatory deferral periods mirroring those in the 
UK are much more appropriate for large banks. Seven-to-ten years has been selected 
because this strikes the appropriate balance between reigning in risk and allowing the 
financial cycle to ‘smooth out’ equity and asset prices and financial performance meas-
urements (Cullen 2014). Whilst investment risks may take years to emerge, arguably 
most would become apparent within a time-frame of  a decade or so. This lengthened 
time horizon therefore ought to capture tail-risk and prevent managers from profiting 
from the effects of  a major credit boom, or from short-term accounting manipulation. 
It would also reduce the need for claw-back which, as we have noted, poses many practi-
cal difficulties if  invoked.
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4.2 Reducing reliance on equity-based pay
In contrast to the so-called ‘best-practice’ approach to aligning pay-with-performance 
by awarding senior employees with equity-based awards enshrined in both current UK 
and EU regulations, we argue that deferred payments ought to be comprised of  instru-
ments which incentivize longer-term investment horizons, rather than the tried, tested 
and failed approach of  virtual wholesale reliance on equity-based payments. Theory 
suggests, of  course, that where agents derive much of  their utility from financial com-
pensation, the most efficient way to contract is to provide them with incentives to align 
their financial interests with those of  their principals. There is a well-developed literature 
which demonstrates a strong positive link between the use of  performance-related pay 
and shareholder returns (Jensen & Murphy 1990; Boschen & Smith 1995), and over the 
past two decades, the use of  equity-based compensation was encouraged – including at 
large banks – across Western jurisdictions by regulators and even legislation.
However, as we have noted previously in the case of  Iceland, relying on equity pay-
ments presents many difficulties, particularly the manipulation of  equity. The banking 
sector has witnessed extreme forms of  RWO, (risk weight optimization) and use of  
SPVs (special purpose vehicles), designed to circumvent capital regulation. Moreover, 
perhaps more dangerously, as we have already noted, equity payments incentivize lever-
age and higher-risk taking. Balachandran et al. (2010) find that approximately 60% of  
the compensation of  named executive officers at US banks comprised equity-based pay. 
Whilst there is some comfort to be had from the increased capital requirements of  Basel 
III, and the strengthening and/or introduction of  binding leverage ratios across cer-
tain jurisdictions, increasing equity requirements may simply not prove sufficient in the 
presence of  high complexity, extreme opaqueness of  ownership structures and cross-
border financial transactions. In this environment, the temptation and the opportunity 
to misreport on equity levels to capture compensation (or other incentives such as job 
retention) remain strong. 
We therefore contend that equity-related incentives ought to comprise no more than 
33% of  the total proportion of  incentive compensation. There are undoubted benefits 
in seeking to align the interests of  agents with their principals, but the large-scale reli-
ance on equity-based pay – especially in combination with the use of  performance tar-
gets such as RoE – arguably poses incentives to manipulate equity levels and/or increase 
leverage. 
4.3 Moving away from RoE as a measure of performance
As highlighted by UK authorities, RoE constitutes a highly imperfect measure of  cor-
porate performance and may incentivize excessive risk. We therefore argue that EU 
banks are forced to move away from using equity-linked metrics with which to judge 
performance. Along with the suggestion in the UK Rem-Code that risk-adjusted profits 
be used as the basis for bonus decisions, rather than RoE or TSR (total shareholder 
return), there have been several recommendations – from scholars in particular – which 
are designed to mitigate the wholesale reliance on equity prices which is currently exhib-
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ited in the calculation of  variable compensation. On this theme, there have been several 
suggested mechanisms.
In examining recent regulatory guidance, the most preferable solution appears to 
have been to require a proportion of  variable compensation to be linked to either RoR-
WA (the current position in relation to compensation at Icelandic banks) or RoA. The 
use of  either RoRWA or RoA reduces the incentives for senior executives to concentrate 
not simply on the returns generated for shareholders, but on the returns generated by 
assets under management (Haldane 2012), and each provides a snapshot of  the effi-
ciency of  the use of  firm capital to generate returns (ie. whether leverage is being used 
optimally). On this basis, a focus on RoRWA or RoA in determining compensation, 
rather than on RoE would have resulted in much lower compensation for senior execu-
tives at financial institutions prior to 2008, and arguably less risk. Moreover, a focus on 
either RoRWA or RoA would preserve some degree of  market discipline, because the 
RoRWA/RoA of  corporations – even banks who hold immense asset volumes – are 
relatively easy to measure and report on.
In terms of  the appropriate measure of  risk to use in these calculations, we submit 
that RoA is on balance to be preferred. Embedding a focus on RoRWA would argu-
ably provide further incentives for bankers to engage in forms of  risk-weighting ma-
nipulation; unlike RoRWA, RoA – much like the leverage ratio in the context of  capital 
requirements regulation – strips out the effects of  risk-weighting of  assets in banks’ 
portfolios, thus avoiding the dangers of  risk-weight optimization (RWO) which, despite 
contributing significantly to the undercapitalization of  the banking system prior to the 
GFC, continues to be employed across today (Blundell-Wignall & Roulet 2013). In be-
nign economic conditions most assets pay off  and banks book capital gains based on 
(today’s) high asset prices. Of  course, this feeds into bank risk models and will tend to 
reduce the overall reported risk of  a banks’ asset portfolio. These dangers would argu-
ably be more potent under the RoRWA incentive system, because additional incentives 
for bankers to manipulate risk-weights will arise. In contrast, a compensation system 
based (to some degree) on RoA – which is based on aggregate asset returns – regardless 
of  the portfolio composition, would not carry the same incentives to engage in RWO 
or asset substitution (although of  course, the same dangers we highlight above – those 
of  increased asset turnover, higher average asset risk and increased use of  securitization 
would remain).
It must be conceded that a migration to these measures may also create (some) 
distortions, which is why the use of  a blend of  metrics in the pay totality calculation is 
to be preferred. Where compensation is deferred, and linked to a firm’s long-run stock 
price or financial returns, payouts vary with the riskiness of  firm assets, which means 
that the optimal way for bankers to maintain high levels of  pay becomes targeting in-
creased levels of  asset risk, rather than manipulation of  the capital structure of  the firm 
(Chason 2013). Indeed, RoRWA/RoA incentives are positively related to risk levels and, 
moreover, very risky firms are characterized by higher ratios of  asset turnover (Cheng et 
al. 2013). On this basis, if  banks begin to switch to compensation plans which explicitly 
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target RoRWA/RoA, the portfolio of  assets held by financial institutions may become 
riskier, or they may engage in greater levels of  asset substitution, making them harder 
to monitor. This may become more potent on the upward curve of  the credit cycle be-
cause as asset values increase, assets become more profitable, and collateral constraints 
are relaxed (Minsky 1986) or sophisticated bankers/lawyers find ways to stretch col-
lateral to use for further asset purchases (Geanakoplos & Zame 2010). Incentivizing a 
focus on either RoRWA/RoA also implicitly encourages securitization of  assets. Whilst 
securitization as a means of  risk transfer and/or diversification is not, in of  itself, an 
unwelcome development, it increases a bank’s RoRWA/RoA by shrinking its balance 
sheet which, of  course, facilitates greater leverage. Embedding a focus on RoRWA/
RoA in compensation contracts may therefore provide unwelcome additional incen-
tives to securitize which have little to do with the efficient allocation of  resources and 
risk, especially as the underpricing of  risk in the securitization market (albeit to achieve 
capital relief) is regarded as a key driver of  the GFC (Brunnermeier & Pedersen 2009; 
Diamond & Rajan 2009). 
For these reasons, we would recommend that at least 35% of  variable compensa-
tion at banks should be determined by reference to RoA, which in our view provides 
an appropriate balance between the various forms of  incentive compensation without 
exposing banks unduly to the increase in asset risk that a singular focus on either RoE 
or RoA as a performance-determining metrics may provide. 
4.4 Constructive ambiguity
We are of  the view that EU regulators ought to follow the Icelandic example, and intro-
duce so-called ‘constructive ambiguity’ into compensation plans at banks, as a rational 
and disciplining force on incentives to game compensation systems. The term ‘construc-
tive ambiguity’ in the context of  financial markets is normally used to discuss the lack of  
specificity given by a Lender of  Last Resort regarding the scope and extent of  its bailout 
policies, with the aim of  instilling market discipline and encourage private sector solu-
tions in preventing excessive risk which may lead to the need for public rescue. In the 
case of  compensation, regulators may use regular reviews of  pay plans and practices to 
prevent bankers from consistently manipulating those plans to their advantage, which is 
achievable thanks to their superior knowledge of  the environment. In fact, instilling any 
ambiguity about what metrics will decide bonus pay in the near future may be construc-
tive by preventing gaming, a commonly identified weakness of  incentive pay, and result 
in superior efficiency in compensation (Ederer et al. 2014). 
4.5 Capping variable pay at 50%
Finally, we recommend that the EU mandatory cap on variable pay across banking insti-
tutions be maintained. This has been perhaps the most contentious regulatory proposal 
in relation to bankers’ pay to arise from the GFC in Europe. We argue that the default 
position that variable compensation must be capped to the same level as fixed com-
pensation (1:1 – in other words, 50%) ought to be enforced absolutely, with no power 
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for shareholders to ratify higher variable compensation, as is currently permitted under 
CRD IV. We believe that the European cap (as opposed to the Icelandic cap of  25%) 
strikes the right balance between prudence and excess, and is unlikely to damage the 
reputation or competitiveness of  the European financial markets, despite some trench-
ant views expressed to the contrary. Of  course, many have argued that an unintended 
consequence of  the cap on variable pay will be an increase in base salaries at financial 
institutions (Murphy 2013) or, indeed the circumvention of  rules on variable pay (for ex-
ample, through the re-categorization of  forms of  compensation as ‘allowances’). Each 
of  these developments will, to some degree, break the supposed link between pay and 
performance at European financial institutions. Yet, what is indisputable is that little 
or no empirical links can be found between a fixed salary model and misreporting or 
excessive risk-taking. Notwithstanding the deep-seated problems with corporate gov-
ernance at banks, shareholders retain the power to reign in boards whose fixed salaries 
they deem ‘excessive’ and if  they are of  the view that senior bankers are shirking and/or 
are simply not ‘worth’ the salaries they are being paid, they can use their voting powers 
to object to compensation packages (Johnston 2014). Very few other industries tolerate 
such large discrepancies between fixed and variable pay and, considering the potentially 
toxic combinations of  the capital and funding structures of  banks, the financial stability 
risks posed by large institutions, and the high-powered incentives present particularly at 
senior levels, limiting variable compensation in this way is arguably justified.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that the program of  reform to senior bankers’ compensa-
tion in the EU is incomplete. In doing so, we have analyzed the law and finance litera-
ture on efficient compensation incentives, as well as drawing on some of  the legislative 
reforms in the EU, UK and Iceland to provide comparative perspectives. We performed 
a brief  empirical analysis of  the events which led to the Icelandic bank collapses during 
the GFC, which exhibited many of  the incentive issues associated with the failure of  
large Western financial institutions, as well surveying elements of  the post-GFC reforms 
to compensation regulation in the EU, the UK and Iceland. Using the case of  Iceland 
as a benchmark (although not a paragon in this regard), as well as observations on simi-
lar trends in the UK and EU, we made some recommendations for further reforms to 
compensation packages which we hope will guard against the danger that compensation 
incentives induce excessive risk-taking in the banking sector going forward.
On this basis, we hope that the recommendations made to address some of  the 
shortcomings of  current and proposed reforms to executive pay at banks which may 
not prove sufficient to curb excessive risk-taking and that, indeed, many of  the more 
‘tried and trusted’ reforms, such as increasing equity incentives in pay packages, are likely 
to have perverse consequences from a financial stability perspective. We further hope 
that these recommendations address worries about the potential complexity of  future 
compensation packages by setting clear and unambiguous bright-line rules to govern 
the composition of  bankers’ pay. In so doing, we also hope to have combined the best 
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of  all possible solutions into workable and efficient solutions to the issue of  executive 
compensation at banks, from the standpoint of  moderating excessive risk, and reducing 
potential costs to society at large.
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